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 What one perceives is often laden with emotionally relevant information.  The 
functionality of an emotion increases if it can get more than just a signal of a particular precept, 
but a conglomeration of the self, the situation and the precept.  Emotion may be an output 
reflecting a summation and computation of the self, the context, and the environment that helps 
one evaluate the day.  Emotion, in this sense, projects idiosyncratic value onto the world; 
emotion helps create an image, which is not necessarily concurrent with any explicit reasoning, 
of what the world means to an individual.  For instance, emotional responses to interpersonal 
interactions often dictate, independent of reason, how we appraise someone (Lazarus, 2006).  
Similarly, emotions felt at a sports game may reflect a combination of both the fans who ones 
roots with and roots against.  The German language has word that expresses the particular 
reaction to an opposing team’s emotional state: “schadenfreude” (Leach, Spears, Branscombe, & 
Doosje, 2003).   This is essentially deriving pleasure from the misfortune of others, and almost 
every sports fan can admit to finding pleasure in a rival team’s defeat, and even the misery of 
their fans.  Similarly, the opposing fans offer diagnostic material independent of actually viewing 
game. A smile from an opposing team’s fan may indicate bad news for my team.  Although not 
as fun or informative as actually watching the game, if one was to solely view the facial 
expressions of an opposing team’s fan, he or she would probably have a pretty good idea about 
the overall course of the game. 
 The current research is designed to address the role of group membership and intergroup 
dynamics in rapidly altering the diagnostic value of ingroup and outgroup member facial 
expressions. To use the above sports analogy for example, a happy countenance of an ingroup 
member means something completely different than a happy countenance of an outgroup 
member.  If the two teams are in competition, the emotion of the outgroup member is likely to 
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mean the opposite of the emotion of the ingroup member.  That is, positive emotional outgroup 
countenances are likely to be responded to negatively, while the same countenance of an ingroup 
member is likely to be responded to positively. In a different context, however, the negative 
affective response towards opposing team members could be mitigated or even reversed.  
Specifically, when the success of the opposing team increase the chances for the success of one’s 
own team this may alter the meaning of the opposing fan’s facial expression.  For instance, if the 
Eagles need the Cowboys, a team despised by many Eagles fans,  to win in order to advance into 
the playoffs, Eagles fans might find a new way of diagnosing the smile of an outgroup member.  
It could produce ambivalence (i.e., simultaneously wish the worse for the Cowboys but need 
something positive to happen to them) or a temporary truce or even alliance.    
Recent literature on emotional contagion and affective transference divulges some of the 
possible mechanisms for converging and diverging, often effortlessly, from the emotions of those 
who surround us.  Research on emotional contagion has shown that people tend to emotionally 
converge with people who become targets of their attention/perception (e.g., Barsade, 
2002;Williams, Bargh, Nocera, & Gray, 2009; Chartrand & Bargh, 1999); one catches the 
emotion of another almost as if it was the flu.  This process seems to begin well before controlled 
processes are said to take place (~20ms versus ~600ms), such that ~20ms is all ones needs 
viewing a picture of someone expressing an emotion for the transference of transference to begin 
(Tamietto & de Gelder, 2008). Hence, catching another’s emotion appears to occur 
automatically. Mirror neurons, primitive mimicry and afferent feedback have all been proposed 
mechanisms for the catching of another’s emotion.  The mirror neuron explanation suggests that 
the same neurons that fire when the perceiver smiles and when the target of perception smiles 
(Ramachandran, 2009).  This suggests that people may be linked at the neurological level 
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through perception; seeing emotion has similar neurological effects as feeling emotion.  Mimicry 
and afferent feedback are thought to combine in a process known as Primitive Emotional 
Contagion.  This process involves a physiological, paraverbal, and nonverbal reaction (e.g., 
positioning and activation of particular facial muscles) that replicates the emotional expressions 
of another (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999;Barsade, 2002).  In this case, these replications initiate a 
reverse causality.  That is, just as sadness can trigger a frown, a frown can produce sadness 
(Soussingnan, 2002).  
Some research shows that emotional contagion serves a functional purpose.  Emotional 
consistency both interpersonally and within the group is propagated by emotional contagion and 
improves the quality of interactions (Barsade, 2002).  Specifically, the interactions become 
smoother, and this leads to increased liking for others (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999).  This would 
do little to explain emotional divergence.  If we simply responded to others’ emotions, group 
membership would not influence our reactions.  Little work has investigated the contextual 
nature of emotional contagion.   
 In the simplest sense, an individual is unlikely to catch the emotion of someone who 
attracts little of his or her attention.  Moreover, attention is known to be a function of how much 
one wants to affiliate with a target person (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999).  Indeed, it has been shown 
that people increase the amount they mimic another based on how much they desire to affiliate 
with the target, and, the more one mimics another, the more one feels affiliated with this person 
(Lakin, Jefferis, Cheng, & Chartrand, 2003).  People try to affiliate with ingroup members more 
than outgroup members (Brown & Zagefka, 2008).  Furthermore, people pay more attention to 
ingroup members.  This can be seen at the neurological level and at the behavioral level.  
Functional imaging has shown that mere categorization is enough to make visual areas of the 
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brain that are correlated with facial scanning more active for novel ingroup members than novel 
outgroup members (Van Bavel, Packer, & Cunningham, 2008).  In addition, mere categorization 
has been shown to cause people to spend a longer time looking at pictures of ingroup members 
(Bernstein, Young, & Hugenberg, 2007). If primitive contagion was the sole mechanism 
underlying emotional contagion effects, and we assume that attention plays a large role in the 
contagion process, one might expect to find differences in contagion based on the group 
membership of the target, as a function of selective attention.  That is, there would be greater 
emotional convergence for ingroup than outgroup members.  It would, however, be difficult for a 
primitive contagion mechanism to explain emotionally diverging from outgroup members.   
Recent research provides evidence of emotional divergence from outgroup members.  
Weisbuch and Ambady’s (2008) research has shown that we diverge from the emotions of 
outgroup members and converge to the emotions of ingroup members.  Specifically, the results 
occurred when viewing a member of another ethnicity and when hearing a story about a member 
of an ingroup or outgroup sports team.  This research has shown that group membership is an 
important factor.  For instance, when primed with an image of a fearful White person, White 
participants responded faster to the word “bad” and slower to the word  “good”.  The opposite 
results were found when the fearful target was Black. This extends the research on primitive 
emotional mimicry, which generally assumes that we pick up the emotions of others through 
mimicking their actions before group membership becomes salient.  Furthermore, the results 
cannot be completely explained with attentional differences because that could only account for 
a greater reaction to an ingroup, not a divergent reaction to the outgroup.  It appears that meaning 
of the emotion differs depending on group membership. For instance, a frown means a 
completely different thing coming from an ingroup member than an outgroup member. 
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 Group membership provides diagnostic material to the self.  It is the reformation of the 
outside world to of the self, as opposed to simply shaping the self to the outside world (that 
might come after the world is shaped to the self).  Again, a smile is not simply a smile, but an 
outside value that is rapidly framed in terms of its meaning to the perceiver.  If I simply started 
affectively and emotionally converging to every target, I would not be relating the target to 
myself, but simply to emotion. The results of Weisbuch and Ambady (2008) show that a smile is 
related to more than just a positive concept; a smile is related to the juxtaposition of two 
concepts: group membership and emotion.  A smile from an outgroup member, for instance, 
brings up two conceptions that combine to form a unique summation.  The individual rapidly 
goes beyond simple recognition of emotion and incorporates group membership, as shown in 
Figure 1 below. 
 
Figure 1: The Role of Group Membership in Affective Priming 
Although this previous research suggests that people respond differently depending on 
the group membership of targets, it is not clear to what extent the broader intergroup context 
affects these responses.  For one, social comparison theorists suggest that one is more likely to 
compare oneself with a relevant other (Festinger, 1954).  If this is the case, people may be more 
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likely to compare the emotions of their group with the emotions of a group that they are in 
competition with versus a group that is merely coexisting with them. Competition might further 
mitigate attentional bias in favor of the ingroup by increasing the importance of understanding 
the outgroup.  In sum, the emotions of an outgroup might become more relevant in competitive 
contexts than in noncompetitive ones. To the extent that emotional comparisons are used as 
diagnostic information about current intergroup status, competition is likely to increase 
emotional contagion to ingroups and divergence from outgroups, at least in many cases. 
One could predict emotional divergence from an outgroup solely on attitudinal grounds: I 
dislike the group, they are happy, therefore I am sad.  However, treating emotional expressions 
as diagnostic information suggests that there may be certain situations when the success of an 
competing outgroup is positive to ingroup members.  Experiencing goal alignment, for example, 
with an outgroup that one is in competition with, might temporarily make one strive for their 
success.  For instance, when teams are vying for playoff positions, it may be important for one’s 
typical rivals to be victorious in a particular contest against a third team; hence, it would be a 
positive experience to see happiness on their faces (for the time being); that is, individuals might 
display emotional contagion to even a disliked outgroup in these specific circumstances.  
Evidence for this type of effect would help to determine whether rapid emotional responses in 
intergroup contexts take more into account than targets’ group memberships.  
The purpose of this study is to extend the understanding of how much is accounted for, 
and the rapidity by which it is accounted, in the emotional contagion process.   We suggest, as 
Weishbuch and Ambady (2008), that there is more to emotional contagion than the simple 
processing of an emotion.  We agree that group membership plays a moderating role on in the 
contagion process, but it is apparent that the meaning of group membership is not immutable.  
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That is, certain situations may change our feelings towards the outgroup.   Furthermore, unlike 
Weishbuch and Ambady, who used real groups, we controlled for extraneous intergroup 
relations, which can confound data, (e.g., stereotypes and history) by using a minimal-type group 
manipulation.   This was done through assigning participants to trivial teams.  The end goal will 
be to isolate group membership and intergroup dynamic, and see their effects on affective 
transference processes.   
As in the Weisbuch and  Ambady study (2008), we used a lexical decision task in order 
to understand how different intergroup dynamics affect intragroup and intergroup affective 
transference.  The lexical decision task measures how accessible a photograph of emotional faces 
makes positive and negative words.  This is measured by the reaction time to a negative or 
positive target word displayed after a rapid display of the picture (320ms).  In the scope of this 
study, the pictures were of ingroup or outgroup members who were either happy or sad.  Each 
picture displayed was followed by a target word that was either positive or negative in valence 
(e.g., sunshine or vomit, respectively).  If people respond faster to positive target words than 
negative words for a particular picture, it is assumed that the picture increased positive affect in 
the individual (or decreased negative affect).  On the other hand, if a person responds faster to 
negative target words than positive target words, it is assumed that the picture increased negative 
affect in the individual (or decreased positive affect). 
 We predicted that rapid affective response would be altered through group membership, 
and that group membership’s diagnostic value is not immutable, but rather based upon on the 
intergroup dynamic; the meaning of an outgroup members countenance changes based on 
whether they groups in competition or goal-aligned (i.e., the ingroup benefits from the success of 
the outgroup).  Specifically, we predicted that when the participant is not assigned to a team, as 
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in the control condition, there should be a general mode of emotional contagion independent of 
group membership and the intergroup dynamic: happy expressions will decrease reaction times 
to positive words and increase the reaction times to negative words, while sad expressions will 
increase reaction times to positive target words and decrease the reaction times to negative target 
words.   When the participant is assigned to a team that is in competition with the outgroup, we 
predicted that emotional contagion would only continue for ingroup members.  We predicted that 
participants would show a different pattern of affective response to outgroup members than 
ingroup members: they would either show no affective priming or, as in Weisbuch and Ambady 
(2008), show affective divergence.   On the other hand, when the ingroup can temporarily benefit 
from the success of the outgroup, the countenances of ingroup and outgroup members will start 
to have similar diagnosticity and thus mitigate disparities in affective responses.  We predicted 
that there would continue to be affective convergence with the ingroup, and either no affective 
priming with the outgroup or affective convergence with the outgroup. 
 
Figure 2: The hypothesized role of group membership and the intergroup dynamic in 
affective transference 
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 The experiment was designed to show that rapid emotional processes are capable of 
compounding conditions.  That is, they are able to combine higher-order conditions to promote a 
more contextually relevant and useful outputs and use the emotional information as a source of 
diagnosticity for the broader social context.  Early work seemed to suggest that emotional 
contagion seemed to suggest primitive contagion.  In this framework, a happy face would prime 
positivity regardless of group membership or the intergroup dynamic.  Weisbuch and Nabady 
(2008) showed conditionality behind affective transference: group membership.  We suggest that 
rapid emotional processes are capable of compounding conditionality.  That is, rapid emotional 
processes are capable of integrating multiple conditions in forming an output as affective state. 
Specifically, we believe that these processes combine information about an expressor’s emotion 
with knowledge of their group membership, as well as a broad intergroup dynamic (i.e., current 
relations between groups). 
  
Experiment 1 
Method 
Design 
 A 3(intergroup dynamic: competition, goal-aligned, or control (no group affiliation))  x 2 
(Expresser group: ingroup, outgroup) x 2 (facial expression: happy, sad)  x 2 (target word 
valence: positive, negative) was used to test the predictions.  Intergroup dynamic was a between 
subjects variable; all others were within subjects variables. 
Participants  
 176 Lehigh University undergraduate students participated for partial course credit.  The 
experiment was run in groups of 2-6, and each participant was assigned a private cubicle where 
they completed the procedure on a computer with E-Prime. 
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Materials 
 Photographs were taken from the MacBrian Face Stimulus Set (Tottenham, 2002).
1
  The 
photographs were of 12 European- American males (6) and females (6).  Each person selected 
had a picture expressing happiness, sadness, and neutral emotion.  The photos were combined 
into two teams of six with an even number of males and females in each. 
Procedure 
Intergroup Dynamic Background: After completing an unrelated study and an informed consent, 
participants were guided through the study through computer prompts.  First participants were 
given a background story that either assigned to the Lions or gave them no group membership 
(the control condition) and briefly explained the relationship between the Lions and the 
outgroup---the Tigers.  In the mode of competition, participants read that the Lions and Ligers 
were in competition and that the Lions---their ingroup--- wanted to the tigers to lose.  In the goal-
alignment condition, participants received the same information, but were also read that their 
ingroup temporarily benefited from the success of the outgroup.  In the control condition, 
participants were not assigned to a group and read about two groups that were in competition.   
Group Memorization: After learning about the intergroup dynamic, participants were asked to 
memorize the members of the ingroup and the outgroup.  Each group had 6 members.  In the 
memorization task participants were shown each group member’s neutral face three times for 5 
seconds. 
Lexical Decision Task: After the memorization task, participants completed 2 practice trials of 
the lexical decision task.   After the practice trials, participants then completed 36 test trials.  
Each trial started with a centered fixation point.  Following the fixation point, participants 
                                                          
1
 Development of the MacBrain Face Stimulus Set was overseen by Nim Tottenham and supported by the John D. 
and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Early Experience and Brain Development. Please 
contact Nim Tottenham at tott0006@tc.umn.edu for more information concerning the stimulus  
set. 
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superliminally viewed (350ms) viewed a happy or sad expression from an ingroup or outgroup 
member.  After viewing another another fixation point, participants responded to either a positive 
target word (e.g., sunshine) or negative target word (e.g.,vomit).  Although participants were told 
to respond as quickly and accurately as possible, the target word stayed on the screen until they 
responded.  Participants indicated whether the target word was positive or negative by pressing 
either 1 or 2 on the number pad.  The keys were adjacent to prevent right or left hand bias.  The 
keys were also counterbalanced across participants.  
Memory Task:  It was vital that participants recalled who was in their ingroup and who was in 
the outgroup.   So, after the lexical decision task, participants viewed images of group members 
and nongroup members (people that were not previously shown).  Participants had to indicate 
whether the person was an ingroup member, an outgroup member, or new. 
Results 
Data Screening 
We eliminated the data of participants who did  not remember their groups or had more than 4 
errors on the memory task.  In total, 32 participants were deleted.  The remaining sample of 144 
had a 94.14% average on the memory task. 
Overarching Results 
Study one showed a trend towards a 4-way Intergroup Dynamic X Team X Emotion X Target 
interaction (b = .41, t = 1.55, p = .12).   
Control Group 
 As shown in Figure 3, Study one’s control group showed a significant emotion x target effect 
(b=.19, t= 1.98, p< .05) that was independent of team (b=.23, t= 1.24, p=. 21).  Specifically, the 
data showed faster response times to positive target words than negative target words after 
participants saw happy faces, while showing slower response times to positive target words than 
negative target words following sad faces.  Thus, participants showed emotional contagion to 
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both groups when they were not a member of either.  This provides a baseline to compare the 
other conditions against. 
 
Figure 3 
Competition 
When participants were assigned to the Lions (ingroup), and the Lions were in the mode of 
competition with the Tigers (outgroup) there was a 3-way Team X Emotion X Target interaction 
(b=.20, t= 2.30, p< .05).   As shown in Figure 4, responses to ingroup faces showed a significant 
Emotion X Target interaction (b=.49, t= 3.37, p < .001).  This Emotion X Target interaction was 
indicative of emotional convergence; that is, participants responded faster to positive words than 
negative words after seeing happy ingroup member faces, while responding slower to positive 
words than negative words after seeing sad ingroup member faces.  In contrast, and as seen in 
Figure 5, response to outgroup pictures showed no significant Emotion X Target interaction 
(b=.04, t=0.32, p = .74).  These results fit our prediction that in a competitive intergroup context 
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there would be a disparity between affective responses to ingroup faces and affective responses 
to outgroup faces: specifically, emotional contagion to ingroup but not to the outgroup.  Results 
did not replicate the affective divergence from outgroup emotion found in Weisbuch and 
Ambady (2008).   
 
Figure 4                                                              Figure 5 
Goal- Aligned 
When participants were assigned to the lions, and the lions were temporarily goal-aligned with 
the tigers there was no 2-way Emotion X Target interaction (b= .11, t= 1.27, p = .20).  In 
addition, team did not play a significant moderating role (b= .05, t= 0.25, p = .70).  As such, 
when the teams were goal-aligned, there did not seem to emotional contagion to either the 
ingroup or the outgroup (as shown in Figures 6 and 7).  These results fit with our predictions.  
That is, the disparity in emotional transference between affective states elicited ingroup 
expressions and affective states elicited from outgroup expressions was minimized.  This 
minimization, however, was not due to an increase in outgroup convergence, but to the decrease 
in ingroup convergence.   
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Figure 6                                                          Figure 7 
 
Discussion 
Study one provided some support for our predictions and justified a second study.  First, there 
was a trend towards a 4-way Intergroup Dynamic X Team X Emotion X Target interaction (b = 
.41, t = 1.55, p = .12).   This provides some evidence that the mind is able to integrate the 
emotion in the context of the expresser’s group membership and the relationship between the 
ingroup and the outgroup.  The control condition, as predicted, showed that the group-
independent affective priming created emotional contagion effects: participants showed 
positivity to happy faces and negativity to sad faces.  In addition, there was no bias towards one 
team or the other team when the participants did not belong to either. When participants were 
assigned, however, to one of the competing teams the emotional contagion only continues to 
occur for the ingroup; responses to the outgroup, on the other hand, show no significant pattern 
of affective priming.    Critically, in the goal-alignment condition, there was no significant 
pattern of affective response to either the ingroup or the outgroup.   It is possible that the 
expression’s diagnosticity was much more ambiguous in this situation. The emotional contagion 
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to the ingroup was lost in this ambiguity, perhaps because people may believe they have 
privileged information about the outgroup.  Another possibility is that the temporary alignment 
of goals may be harder to keep track off than competition and thus more cognitively taxing; 
competition may be a more default mode of seeing intergroup relations, and the processes 
required to see it differently drain cognitive resources to the point of losing emotional contagion.  
Participants, in a sense, may have been too busy to be affected by others’ emotions in this model.    
There were, however, a number of limitations to this study.  For instance, the 
memorization task may have been too taxing on participants, as could be seen in the amount of 
participants that needed to be dropped from the study due to forgetting who was in their group.  
The cognitive demands of remembering faces could have affected the responses, as well.  In the 
second study we removed the memorization task and added a color background to denote team 
membership, so that participants had a visual cue as to who was on which team.  In addition, we 
wanted to see if these results had to do with changes in participants’ identification with the 
ingroup or attitudes with the outgroup as a function of intergroup dynamic.  
Experiment 2 
Methods 
Overview  
 Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 2 in design and procedure, but sought to 
reduce noise in the data by minimizing the role of memory.  To minimize the role of memory 
each group was assigned a particular color and that color was placed as the background of every 
picture.  Due to this addition, the memorization task and memory check were unnecessary and 
removed.  In addition, following the lexical decision task, we assessed participants’ identification 
with the ingroup and attitudes towards the outgroup. 
Participants 
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 51 participants (20 men, 30 women, and 1 did not report) Lehigh University students (40 
undergraduates, 10 graduates, and 1 did not report) participated for $10.00.  The experiment was 
run in groups of 2-6, and each participant was assigned a private cubicle where they completed 
the procedure on a computer with E-Prime. 
 
Results 
Overarching Results 
Whereas Study 1 showed a pursuable trend towards a 4-way interaction (b=.41, t= 1.55, p= .12), 
Study 2 showed a significant 4-way interaction (b= .77, t= 2.73, p < .05).  That is, Study 2 
showed that the results were a product of an interaction between facial expression, expresser 
group, intergroup dynamic, and target word valence.   We decompose this interaction by 
examining effects within each between subjects condition. 
Competition  
As in Study 1, when participants were assigned to the Lions (ingroup), and the lions were in the 
mode of competition with the Tigers (outgroup) there was a 3-way Team X Emotion X Target 
interaction (b=.47, t= 1.88, p< .06).   As shown in Figure 8, reactions to ingroup faces showed a 
significant Emotion X Target interaction (b=.51, t= 2.65, p < .01), also mirroring Study 1.  This 
Emotion X Target interaction was indicative of emotional convergence; that is, participants 
responded faster to positive words than negative words after seeing a happy ingroup member 
faces, but responding slower to positive words than negative words after seeing sad ingroup 
member faces.  Contrastingly, as shown in Study 1, and as shown in Figure 9, outgroup pictures 
showed no significant Emotion X Target interaction (b=.04, t=0.23, p = .82).  These results fit 
our prediction that in competition there would be a disparity between affective responses to 
ingroup faces and affective responses to outgroup faces.  Again, the results did not replicate the 
affective divergence from outgroup emotion found in Weisbuch and Ambady (2008).   
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Figure 8                                                               Figure 9 
 
Goal-Alignment 
When participants were assigned to the Lions, and the Lions were temporarily goal-aligned with 
the Tigers there was a significant 3-way Team X Emotion X Target interaction (b = .30, t= -2.18, 
p < .05).   That is, when teams are temporarily goal-aligned reaction times were a product of 
facial expression, expresser group, and target word valence.  Specifically, as shown in Figure 10, 
participants showed a trend towards emotional divergence from ingroup members (b = -.18, t = 
1.62, p = .11) and, as shown in Figure 11, emotional convergence with outgroup members (b = 
.12, t = 1.48, p = .14).  The trend of emotional convergence seen in response to outgroup faces 
was in line with predictions, but the trend of emotional divergence from the ingroup was not.  
That is, we expected participants to start converging with outgroup members or begin to show 
more covergence with outgroup members in the mode of goal-alignment than in the mode of 
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competition, but our predictions did not encompass the trend of ingroup divergence.  Possible 
reasons for ingroup divergence will be discussed below. 
 
Figure 10                                                              Figure 11 
 
Identification or Attitude 
In Study 2, we also assessed participants’ levels of  identification with the ingroup (alpha 
= .92) and their attitudes to toward the outgroup (alpha = .70).   Neither identification nor 
attitudes differed as a function of intergroup dynamic.  Specifically, participants in the 
competition reported similar levels of identification with the ingroup as participants in the goal-
aligned condition (2.99 and 3.27, respectively; F(1, 49) = 0.59, p > .40) and similar attitudes to 
the outgroup (2.20 and 2.17, respectively; F(1,49) = 0.01, p > .90).  This finding shows the 
differences in emotional priming across conditions cannot be explained by participants in the 
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goal-aligned condition feeling less identified with their group or having more positive attitudes 
toward the outgroup.  
 
Discussion 
Study 2’s significant 4-way interaction suggests that group membership and the 
intergroup dynamic were important factors in processing the emotion and ending with an 
affective state.  When the groups where in competition, participants affectively converged with 
the ingroup and showed no significant affective response to the outgroup.  When the ingroup 
temporarily benefitted from outgroup’s success, the pattern of affective response significantly 
differed from the pattern of affective responses of the competition condition.  This pattern 
suggests that the diagnostic value of the face changes not only to group membership, but to the 
dynamic between the groups as well.  The change in responses between the competition 
condition and goal-alignment condition was not due to changes in identification levels with the 
ingroup or attitude towards the outgroup.  The data also suggests two interesting trends within 
the goal-alignment condition: ingroup divergence and outgroup convergence.   Outgroup 
convergence fits well with our predictions: when the outgroup’s success can temporarily benefit 
the ingroup, it seems fits within our predictions that happy outgroup members elicit a state of 
positivity and sad outgroup members elicit a state of negativity.  Ingroup divergence is a bit more 
of a cumbersome finding.  This finding is discussed below. 
General Discussion 
This research provides evidence that the diagnostic value or meaning of emotional 
expressions is moderated by the group membership of who is expressing the emotion and the 
overall intergroup context.  These data suggest that rapid emotional processes do not simply 
respond to bottom-up or low-level emotional signals.  The value of an emotion that is displayed 
for 3.5/10
ths
 of a second is not solely based upon the emotion itself, but the context surrounding 
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the emotion.  In sum, for all of the information (i.e., group membership, intergroup dynamic, and 
emotional expression) to be amalgamated in such a short time frame shows not only the saliency 
of group membership and intergroup dynamics, but the rapidity with which the mind can 
compute the layers of the context.     
 The minor alterations of a few sentences was all that was needed to show the unstable 
meaning of an expression.   As in Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, and Flament (1971) the creation of 
trivial groups or categorizations proved to be all that was necessary in creating bias towards the 
ingroup.  This study was able to show that this bias created by assigning participants to minimal-
type groups extends into affective responses.  Merely being assigned to the Lions was all the 
participants needed to show biased affective responses.  Affective responses were also sensitive 
to the short background story about the dynamic between the Lions and Tigers.   Affective states 
were dependent on whether or not the competing outgroup’s success could temporarily benefit 
the ingroup.  It was not necessary to say what they were in competition over or how outgroup 
success could benefit the ingroup to conjure these results.  The data shows that trivial groups in a 
superficial context can evoke changes in rapid affective responses to expressions. 
 When participants were told that their ingroup (Lions) was in competition with the 
outgroup (Tigers), emotional contagion only occurred while viewing the expressions of ingroup 
members, not outgroup members.  There was no significant pattern of affective convergence 
with the outgroup, as expected.  In addition, there was no evidence, as there was in Weisbuch 
and Ambady (2008), of emotional divergence to the outgroup.  This evidence sits well with 
Brewer (1999) in that positivity towards the ingroup is not reciprocally related to the negativity 
towards the outgroup.  “Discrimination between ingroups and outgroups is a matter of relative 
favoritism toward the ingroup and the absence of equivalent favoritism towards the outgroup” 
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(Brewer, 1999, p. 434).  Another possible explanation for the lack of emotional divergence is 
that the minimal-type group manipulation was not powerful enough to replicate the true ingroup-
outgroup divide.  The emotional convergence to the ingroup when the groups were in 
competition suggests that there was a sense of group investment .  It is also possible the real 
groups (e.g., baseball teams and ethnicities) used in their studies carried multiple group-
extraneous relations that were beyond direct groupiness; there could have been confounding 
relations such as stereotypes and prior attitudes.  Our minimal-type group manipulation was 
chosen to focus on groupiness and its immediate context (i.e., goal-alignment or competition).  
 When participants read that outgroup success would temporarily benefit the ingroup, the 
patterns of affective response showed a contrast to affective responses of participants in the 
competition condition.  Although Study 1 did not show a significantly different overall patter of 
affective response, the individuals levels showed changes in response pattern.  Namely, the 
affective contagion effect found in the competition condition with the ingroup disappeared in the 
goal-alignment condition.  It is possible that this is the result of a state of ambiguity brought out 
in the condition of goal-alignment.  Participants may have had to make too many assumptions 
(e.g., does the rest of the ingroup know the role of the outgroup in benefitting the ingroup?).   
The pattern of no affective priming to the outgroup may be a result of indifference, like in the 
competition conditions.  It is also possible that there was ambivalence regarding the outgroup 
members emotion.  The smile of an outgroup member may combine both good and bad 
implications.  Moreover, the prompt did not indicate if outgroup failure had any effect on the 
ingroup, leaving a wide variety of predictable affective response to a sad outgroup members (i.e., 
possibilities include anything from something that would hurt the ingroup to something that 
would only fail to benefit the ingroup).  Future studies may benefit from indicating what 
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outgroup failure means to the ingroup in the goal-alignment condition.   It is also possible that 
the participants were cognitively overloaded.  The memory task may have made the move 
towards emotional evaluation a difficult one.  Moreover, adding to the cognitive complexity, the 
goal-alignment condition may be more cognitively demanding than the competition condition.  
That is, competition may be closer to the default way of viewing the relationship between the 
ingroup and outgroup.   Goal-alignment may have required extra cognitive effort due to being 
further away from the default mode of viewing the relationship between the ingroup and the 
outgroup. 
 In Study 2, within the goal-alignment condition, the data showed a significantly different 
overall pattern from the competition condition.  The patterns within the goal-alignment condition 
are suggestive of affective divergence from the ingroup and affective convergence to the 
outgroup (both of these only approached significance).  The results suggest that the participants 
were able to find diagnosticity in the emotional reactions, unlike Study 1.  The patterns of 
affective response imply that participants were neither too cognitively burdened nor confused to 
find meaning from the emotional expressions.  The affective convergence to outgroup members 
fits well within our predictions.  The outgroup’s success benefits the ingroup and, thus, a happy 
outgroup member may signal the outgroup’s success, which is good news for the ingroup and 
likely to trigger positivity.  Affective divergence from the ingroup, however, is much more 
difficult to integrate into our predictions.  It is possible that participants assumed ingroup 
members where not privy to the information about the temporary role of the outgroup.  In 
addition, they also must have assumed that the emotions of the ingroup members were products 
of emotionally diverging reactions to the outgroup.   Consequently, sadness coming from the 
ingroup member would be indicative of outgroup success, and may be reason enough to elicit 
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positivity; this positivity would be affectively diverging from ingroup emotional displays.  It 
would be very unexpected if all of these assumptions were capable of being processed in such a 
short time frame. 
 It is clear that a smile does not always elicit a state of positivity, and that the resultant 
affective state transferred from the smile is moderated by group membership and group dynamic, 
but where does the smile lose its sense positivity?  That is, is the value of an emotion changing, 
or is the emotion simply not being sensed?  It may be that there is an indifference towards 
outgroup members that causes participants not to focus on the emotional responses of outgroup 
members; this lack of focus or attention would make affective priming unlikely.  Again, research 
at the neuronal level has shown decreased activity in facial processing areas when viewing 
outgroup members as opposed to ingroup members (Van Bavel, Packer, & Cunningham, 2008).   
On the other hand, it is completely possible that the indifference to the outgroup does not occur 
at the level attention, but somewhere after the smile has been perceived.  For instance, 
participants may perceive ingroup smiles only to attribute little diagnostic meaning to them.  As 
a consequence of this, participants are not likely to be affectively primed by outgroup members.   
Only the affective divergence from the ingroup found in the goal-alignment condition of 
Study 2 gives some insight as to whether the disparity in affective priming between the ingroup 
and outgroup has something to do with attention or mid-process altering of an emotion’s 
meaning.  The trend of affective divergence found in Study 2 suggests that participants needed to 
be cognizant of the emotional expression and alter its diagnostic meaning; this indicates that 
affective response is beyond focus, at least at this particular level (i.e., Study 2’s goal-alignment 
condition while viewing ingroup faces).   Any form of affective convergence only guarantees 
that the emotion was sensed, but, when an emotion is affectively diverged from, the emotion was 
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not only sensed, but then given an opposite meaning somewhere during the process.  
Notwithstanding, whether the results were products of an allocation of focus or something 
occurring post-production, the rapid affective processes are still able to integrate group 
membership of the expresser and the intergroup dynamic to the emotional expression.  The end 
consequence of these rapid affective processes is a context-specific affective state.   
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